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NOTE
WHY SO GLUM?
TOWARD A FAIR BALANCE OF
COMPETITIVE INTERESTS IN DIRECT-
TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING AND
THE WELL-BEING OF THE MENTALLY
ILL CONSUMERS IT TARGETS
Erin Lenhardt
I. INTRODUCTION
You are likely to have seen the ads on television. In one, a for-
lorn, misshapen oval shuffles across a white field only to encounter a
group of contented ovals of which he is too anxious to become a part.
When our friend the oval encounters a prescription pharmaceutical;
however, its shuffle becomes a bounce, and its frown converts into a
grin. Such direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) is a product of the
last decade,' when the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) relin-
quished a measure of its control over pharmaceutical companies' ad-
vertising strategies. 2 DTCA "has been defined as 'promotional efforts
by a pharmaceutical company to present prescription drug or drug
J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I would
like to thank Professors Sharona Hoffman and Melvyn Durchslag for their guidance
in writing this note. Loving dedication of the note is made to C. Sims Lenhardt for
his support throughout law school and during the writing process, to Robin E. Guthrie
for her friendship, and to Dan and Connie Spahn for their steadfast encouragement of
my legal education. The views set forth herein do not necessarily reflect those of the
law firm with which the author is to be associated.
1 Milton Liebman, FDA Takes the Mystery Out of TV Ads, MED.
MARKETING & MEDIA, Sept. 1997, at 34-36 (discussing the beginning of DTCA and
outlining requirements for pharmaceutical advertisements on television).
2 Nicholas P. Terry, Cyber-Malpractice: Legal Exposure for Cybermedi-
cine, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 327, 342 (1999) ("The pharmaceutical industry has zeal-
ously adopted DTC advertising. The impetus came, of course, when the Food and
Drug Administration ... relaxed many of its marketing controls.") (citations omitted).
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therapy information to the general public through the lay media."'' 3
Pharmaceutical companies' increased spending on DTCA is evidence
of their interest in the proliferation of their brand through exposure to
a broad audience of end-users.4 Indeed, DTCA investing reached $1.3
billion in the United States in the year 2000.5 Additionally, 8.5 mil-
lion Americans each year request prescriptions based on the content of
DTCA campaigns and subsequently receive those prescriptions from
their doctors.6
On the other hand, the audience of consumers has important inter-
ests at stake. In one regard, consumers benefit from the information
in the ads. Arguably, the product information empowers patients to
participate more actively in their health care. However, the informa-
tion in these ads is suspect. Pharmaceutical companies seek to cast
their products in a positive light, and conventional marketing wisdom
advises that they target the niche which is most vulnerable to their
message.7 Moreover, the one-sided nature of advertising media like
magazines, television broadcasts, and even web banners does not
promote immediate discourse. Doctors and potential patients cannot
rebut the assertions made in the ads, and sometimes do not realize the
persuasive effect of the spin contained therein.8 In many ways, there-
fore, the audience of potential end-users is held captive to drug com-
panies' rights to advertise. This note will focus on pharmaceutical
companies' efforts to target individuals with illness and to carve out a
new market among individuals who have been functioning without the
3 Christine M. Cutrer & Andreas M. Pliel, Potential Outcomes Associated
with Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs: Physicians' Perspec-
tives, 5 J. PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING & MGMT. 4 (1991).
4 See Marta Wosifiska, Just What the Patient Ordered? Direct-to-Consumer
Advertising and the Demand for Pharmaceutical Products, HARvARD BUSINESS
SCHOOL MARKETING RESEARCH PAPERS, No. 02-04, Oct. 2002, at 1, at
http://ssm.com/abstractid=347005 ("Only five years ago, ads for prescription drugs
were rare, but now some prescription drugs have advertising budgets that top familiar
brands such as Pepsi, Budweiser, Dell or Nike.").
5 Barbara Mintzes, For and Against: Direct to Consumer Advertising is
Medicalising Normal Human Experience, 324 BRIT. MED. J., 908,909 n.2 (2002).
6 Faith McLellan, US Government Report Released On Deceptive Drug
Advertisements, 360 LANCET 1951, 1951 (2002) ("[E]ach year some 8.5 million con-
sumers ask their doctors for and receive a prescription for a drug they have seen as
part of a DTC advertising campaign.").
7 See generally PHILIP KOTLER, A FRAMEWORK FOR MARKETING
MANAGEMENT 170-187 (2d ed. 2003).
8 Of course, physicians are claimed to act as the "learned intermediary"
between the drug companies and consumers, but doctors do not filter the immediate
effect of the advertisement upon consumers. See infra note 111, for more explana-
tion of the "learned intermediary" doctrine.
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aid of drugs but who may be persuaded into believing that they need
pharmaceuticals to help them cope with mental inadequacies.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to understand how DTCA
is currently regulated. The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) is
the authority under which the FDA regulates and enforces the sale of
prescription drugs in the United States.9 All drug advertising, includ-
ing DTCA of prescription drugs, is regulated by the FDA, through its
administrative powers.10 However, unless a drug company requests
early review of a draft advertisement, FDA review of pharmaceutical
advertisements is only made post hoc, after the public has been ex-
posed to the advertisements.l' Regulation of advertisements is gener-
ally post hoc as well. FDA enforcement includes sending cease and
desist and warning letters to offending drug companies and requesting
that such companies broadcast remedial advertisements to correct any
misrepresentations.12 The FDA does not have the authority to fine
drug companies.' 3
False advertising, therefore, is regulated and punished by the
FDA. However, many "truthful" ads, as defined by FDA regulations,
continue to enjoy publication and stream into our living rooms to as-
sert that we, or our friends and family, are walking around with latent
9 See Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs: What are the
Consequences?: Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 35
(2003) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement by Janet Woodcock, M.D. Director, Center
for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration) available at
http://www.fda.gov/ola/2003/AdvertisingofPrescritpionDrugs0722.html (last visited
October 15, 2004):
FDA regulates the manufacture, sale, and distribution of drugs in the United
States under authority of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FD&C)
Act (or the Act), which includes approval of prescription drug labeling that
provides information about the use of a drug. Section 502(n) of the Act
provides the Agency with authority to regulate prescription drug advertise-
ments and the implementing regulations (Title 21, Code of Federal Regula-
tions [CFR] section 202.1) which provide specifics about the content of
such advertisements.
10 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2004).
" See Hearing, supra note 9, at 36:
FDA generally cannot require that prescription drug advertisements be re-
viewed and approved prior to their use. Prior FDA review of advertisements
occurs only in very narrow circumstances, primarily for products receiving
accelerated approvals. In other words, FDA's review of promotional mate-
rials is intended to occur post hoc - once the materials have appeared in
public.
12 Id. at 36, 42-46 (stating that companies are urged to correct any "misim-
pressions created by false, misleading, or unbalanced materials.").
13 David 0. Antonuccio et al., Psychology in the Prescription Era: Building
a Firewall Between Marketing and Science, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1028, 1030
(2003).
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problems in desperate need of the aid of prescription drugs. Because
DTCA, though legally truthful, may be based on biased and/or mis-
representative information, the interests of consumers, as well as those
of drug companies, would be better served were the FDA to conduct
an early evaluation of all final drafts of broadcast direct-to-consumer
advertisements.
Pharmaceutical companies should make mandatory submissions
to the FDA before any DTC advertisement is circulated. Borrowing
from marketing research techniques, which are developed to assess
the effect of advertising and positioning on the target audience, an
early evaluation of DTC advertisements should include focus groups
and survey evidence to consider how the ads may affect certain vul-
nerable or targeted audiences. Then, the advertisement should be
evaluated under a balancing test which weighs the drug company's
right to commercial speech and trademark use versus the potential
harm to targeted audiences. In order to enhance the potential educa-
tional benefit of DTCA, clinical reports and journal articles should
more clearly disclose any conflicts of interest.
Part I of this note will present background on how DTCA is cur-
rently regulated. Part II will discuss the advantages of DTCA. The
first section in Part II will explore legal and market advantages to drug
companies. The advantages considered stem from free commercial
speech and trademark protection through advertising. The second
section in Part II will examine whether DTCA offers consumers any
information and empowerment advantage. Part III will address the
disadvantages of DTCA. The first section in Part III will examine the
concerns that DTCA raises about financial conflicts of interest in re-
search which taint the information that potential and actual patients
receive through the advertisements. The second section in Part III
will discuss the danger of "medicalization," or assigning a disease
state to non-medical mental complications. 14 Finally, Part IV offers
several solutions which will respect American values of freedom of
speech and free market economics while protecting consumers' inter-
ests in helpful information about health care.
14 Ichiro Kawachi & Peter Conrad, Medicalization and the Pharmacological
Treatment of Blood Pressure, in CONTESTED GROUND: PUBLIC PURPOSE AND PRIVATE
INTERESTS IN THE REGULATION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 26, 26 (Peter Davis ed., 1996)
(defining and exploring the issue of medicalization).
[Vol. 15:165
WHY SO GLUM?
II. BACKGROUND
A. Regulation Overview: Prescriptions for Truth in Direct-to-
Consumer Advertising
The parameters within which prescription drug companies may
advertise are defined by a variety of statutes in addition to common
law precedent construing Constitutional commercial speech.15 First, §
202.1 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations sets forth, in
detail, the manner in which drug companies may advertise.' 6 Section
202.1 addresses fine points such as ingredient information place-
ment,17 the manufacturer's duty to refrain from hyperbolic trade
names,' 8 the typeface size of the drug name in relation to that of the
manufacturer's name,' 9 and the requirement of a "brief summary"
describing potential side effects, efficacy, and contraindications.2 °
While § 202.1 relates specifically to prescription drug advertising,
other regulations require truth in advertising more generally.
The Lanham Act (the Act) more generally regulates false advertis-
ing. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act regulates false advertising with
regard to trademarks:
2
'
15 Commercial speech is considered more extensively with regard to the
advantages that drug companies enjoy from DTCA, infra Part 1I.
16 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2004).
17 § 202. 1(a)(1) ("The ingredient information required by section 502(n) of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall appear together, without any inter-
vening written, printed, or graphic matter .... ").
18 § 202.1(3) ("The advertisement shall not employ a fanciful proprietary
name for the drug or any ingredient in such a manner as to imply that the drug or
ingredient has some unique effectiveness or composition, when, in fact, the drug or
ingredient is a common substance ... .
'9 § 202.1(b)(2):
The established name shall be printed in letters that are at least half as large
as the letters comprising the proprietary name or designation with which it
is joined, and the established name shall have a prominence commensurate
with the prominence with which such proprietary name or designation ap-
pears, taking into account all pertinent factors, including typography, lay-
out, contrast, and other printing features.
(emphasis added).
20 § 202.1(e) (defining the "brief statement" and declaring when it must
appear in an advertisement: "True statement of information in brief summary relating
to side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness . . . [is required for advertise-
ments] broadcast through media such as radio, television, or telephone communica-
tions systems .... ).
21 See generally P. Cameron DeVore & Steven G. Brody, Advertising and
Commercial Speech, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW 2001, at 349 (PLI Intellectual Prop.
Practice Course, Handbook Series No. G-680, 200 1).
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(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which-
A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin, spon-
sorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or B) in com-
mercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the na-
ture, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his
or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial
activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged
by such act.22
The Lanham Act was originally enacted in 1946 pursuant to the
United States' entry into numerous treaties to protect the country
against unfair international trade customs 23 and amended in 1988 to
regulate false advertising more specifically.24 Though some courts
have implied that the Lanham Act protects consumers in general,25 the
majority of courts have held that the Lanham Act is focused not on
consumer protection, but on unfair competition. 26 As such, the long-
standing and current reality is that the Act does not provide standing
22 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
23 MATTHEW BENDER, 2-15 THE LAW OF ADVERTISING (MB) § 15.02 (2004):
During the early part of the twentieth century, the United States entered into
a number of treaties in order to protect itself and other countries from unfair
international trade practices. Certain provisions of these treaties obligated
the United States and the other signatories to enact domestic laws for im-
plementation. As a result, the Lanham Act, a comprehensive law dealing
primarily with trademark protection, was enacted by Congress in 1946.
24 Id. ("Section 43(a) was amended in 1988 to specifically denote false ad-
vertising as a cause of action within its purview.").
25 E.g. Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 141 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
26 Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1996)
("(M]ost courts that have addressed the issue agree that in light of the pro-competitive
purpose language found in § 45, 'consumers fall outside the range of 'reasonable
interests' contemplated as protected by the false advertising prong of Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act."' (quoting Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1177 (3d Cir.
1993))).
[Vol. 15:165
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for individual consumer suits. 27 Nor does a state have standing to
bring a suit on behalf of consumers under the Lanham Act.
28
Under the theory that the Lanham Act covers unfair competition,
courts have interpreted the Act to allow recovery to commercial enti-
ties that can prove they have been harmed by a competitor's false or
misleading advertising. 29 For such plaintiffs, the Lanham Act permits
two categories of recovery. 30 Advertising may be (1) false on its face;
or (2) literally true but likely to confuse and/or mislead in the context
in which it is marketed or sold.31 If an advertisement is patently false,
27 See id.
28 E.g. Florida ex rel. Broward County v. Eli Lilly & Co., 329 F. Supp.
364 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (holding that a state, on behalf of its consumer-citizens who
were harmed by deceptive prescription drug practices, does not have standing under
either the Lanham Act or the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act). See also
MATTHEW BENDER, 2-15 THE LAW OF ADVERTISING (MB) § 15.02 (2004):
The state brought a class action on behalf of itself and consumers against
the defendant drug company alleging, in a second amended complaint, in
part, that the class had sustained damages as the result of false representa-
tions by defendant regarding the effectiveness of certain drugs, giving rise
to a cause of action under Section 43(a). The court held that members of the
general public, as consumers rather than competitors, have no right of ac-
tion under the Lanham Act. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on
the purpose of the Act ... as well as on certain writers in the field.29 See Seven-Up, 86 F.3d at 1383, (quoting Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers
v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 859 F. Supp. 1521, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
30 j. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 27:55 (4th ed. 2003).
31 Id. at n.2 (citing examples of courts interpreting two theories of recovery):
First Circuit: Clorox Co. Puerto Rico v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial
Co., 228 F.3d 24, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 47 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1166 (1st Cir.
2000).
Second Circuit: Johnson & Johnson v. GAC Int'l, Inc., 862 F.2d 975, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d 1316 (2d Cir. 1988); Johnson & Johnson Merck Consumer
Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d 1362 (2d Cir. 1992) (claiming that "In order to recover damages
or obtain equitable relief, a plaintiff must show that either: 1) the challenged
advertisement is literally false, or 2) while the advertisement is literally true
it is nevertheless likely to mislead or confuse customers.") id.; S.C. Johnson
& Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 241 F.3d 232, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1912 (2d Cir.
2001) (ad which is literally false requires no proof of the ad's meaning to
the public).
Third Circuit: Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
1666, 1669 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Thus, there are two different theories of recov-
ery for false advertising under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: '(1) an ad-
vertisement may be false on its face; or (2) the advertisement may be liter-
ally true, but given the merchandising context, it nevertheless is likely to
mislead and confuse consumers."') id.; Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v.
Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co., 290 F.3d 578,
62 U.S.P.Q.2d 1757 (3d Cir. 2002) ("If a plaintiff proves that the chal-
20051
HEALTH MATRIX
courts will hold the ad in violation of the statute even absent evidence
regarding how consumers are affected by the message in the ad.
32
However, when an advertisement is only implicitly false - meaning
that the advertisement is per se true but nonetheless likely to mislead
consumers - market research is conducted to ascertain whether con-
sumers will, in fact, be misled by the advertisement in question.33 The
market research used to investigate whether an ad is implicitly false
includes consumer questionnaires, surveys and focus groups, which
must be considered as evidence of how consumers perceive the mes-
sage in the advertisement.34 Also, at any stage beyond preliminary
lenged commercial claims are 'literally false,' a court may grant relief with-
out considering whether the public was actually misled.") id.
Fifth Circuit: Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Intern., Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 497,
56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 920, 121 S. Ct.
1355, 149 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2001); IQ Products Co. v. Pennzoil Products Co.,
305 F.3d 368, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1622 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
1632, 155 L. Ed. 2d485 (U.S. 2003).
Sixth Circuit: American Council v. American Board of Podiatric Surgery,
Inc., 185 F.3d 606, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481 (6th Cir. 1999) (following the dis-
tinction and finding that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evdience of
"actual deception") id.; Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports and Ex-
ports, Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1633 (6th Cir. 2001) (advertising
that may have implied, but did not literally state, that defendant's imitation
chairs were genuine Eames-designed and Herman Miller-produced chairs
was not a violation where plaintiff failed to prove that customers perceived
the advertising as deceptive).
Eighth Circuit: United Industries Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d 1337 (8th Cir. 1998).
Ninth Circuit: Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff may show that "he statement was
literally false, either on its face or by necessary implication, or that the
statement was literally true but likely to mislead or confuse consumers").
32 Id. at § 27.55.
33 id.; Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir.
1982) (holding that Coke is entitled to an injunction if Tropicana's statement that it is
the only orange juice not made with concentrate and water is found to be a misrepre-
sentation); and Jacob Jacoby et al., Survey Evidence In Deceptive Advertising Cases
Under The Lanham Act: An Historical Review of Comments From the Bench, 84
TRADEMARK REP. 541, 542-47 (1994).
34 MCCARTHY, supra note 30, at § 27:55. A helpful explanation of how
survey evidence is used to prove that the challenged ad is misleading is provided in
Jacoby, supra note 33, at 544, stating:
While consumers' beliefs about what the ad is saying ... and their beliefs
about the product itself . . . may be correlated, the key to assessing likely
deception concerns the former. Surveys seeking to measure likely consumer
deception need to focus on what the consumer believes the ad said or im-
plied about the product.., not necessarily on what the consumer believes
about the product itself .... Consumer surveys would also be relevant for
assessing "materiality," i.e., whether the incorrect understanding then made
a difference in the consumers' decision and purchasing behavior.
[Vol. 15:165
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injunction, it is important that market research and survey evidence
elicit how consumers have actually reacted to the advertisement ver-
sus how they may have reacted."
In addition to regulation of advertising under the Lanham Act,
discussed above, § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA),
15 U.S.C. § 45,36 regulates misleading and false advertising. Specifi-
cally, § 5, entitled "Unfair Methods of Competition," announces that
deceptive or unfair business practices are unlawful. 37 Regulation un-
der the FTCA has been controversial and has spurred debate on issues
such as federalism, the threat of over-reaching regulation, and whether
the FTC could restrict unfair advertising which is not deemed to be
false or deceptive. 8 But President Clinton reauthorized the FTC in
1994 for the first time since 1980.39 As such, the FTC may not deter-
mine that an act is unfair and thus unlawful 40 "unless the act or prac-
tice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers that is
not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not out-
weighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.''41
Each state has adopted its own version of the FTC regulations in sec-
tion 5 to define deceptive, unfair and/or misleading business practices.
(emphasis added).
35 McCARTHY, supra note 30, at § 27:55.
36 15 U.S.C. § 45 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Declaration of unlawfulness; power to prohibit unfair practices; inappli-
cability to foreign trade
(1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
hereby declared unlawful.
(2) The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent per-
sons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks, savings and loan in-
stitutions described in section 57a(f)(3) of this title, Federal credit un-
ions described in section 57a(f)(4) of this title, common carriers sub-
ject to the Acts to regulate commerce, air carriers and foreign air carri-
ers subject to part A of subtitle VII of title 49, and persons, partner-
ships, or corporations insofar as they are subject to the Packers and
Stockyards Act, 1921, as amended [7 U.S.C. § 181 et seq.], except as
provided in section 406(b) of said Act [7 U.S.C. § 227(b)], from using
unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.
(emphasis added).
37 Bruce I. Mc Daniel, Annotation, What Constitutes "False Advertising" of
Drugs or Devices Within §§ 5 and 12 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15
USCS. §§ 45, 52), 49 A.L.R. Fed. 16, 24 (1980) (discussing federal cases and FTC
decisions concerning the illegality of unfair or deceptive advertising of drugs or de-
vises).
38 DeVore, supra note 21, at 384.
39 d.
4 id.
41 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2000).
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These acts are sometimes called "Little FTC Acts. '42 The acts differ
from state to state, but "they have in common a core set of standards
forbidding 'unfair' or 'deceptive' practices, as well as provisions for
governmental and private enforcement of the acts. 43
Having broadly considered the way in which truth in advertising
generally, and DTCA specifically, is regulated, the advantages of
DTCA may be more readily ascertained. The following section be-
gins with advantages from the point of view of pharmaceutical com-
panies.
III. DTCA: THE ADVANTAGES
Among the advantages of DTCA are (1) freedom of commercial
expression; (2) maximization of investments in product quality
through trademark law; and (3) consumer empowerment through di-
rect access to relevant healthcare information. In the sections which
follow, these advantages are explored in greater depth.
1. Freedom of Expression
One arguable advantage of DTCA is that it encourages free ex-
pression. Under the First Amendment, pharmaceutical companies are
enabled to communicate their marketing messages because these mes-
sages are protected as commercial speech.44
The right to commercial speech was first addressed and rejected
by the Supreme Court in 1942 in Valentine v. Christensen.45  Cur-
42 Gail E. Lees, The Defense of Private and Governmental Unfair Competi-
tion Law Claims, in UNFAIR COMPETITION CLAIMS 2003: CALIFORNIA SECTION
17200's IMPACT ON CONSUMERS AND BUSINESSES EVERYWHERE, at 261, 297 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 694, 2003).
43 id.
44 Jack B. Harrison & Mina J. Jerrerson, "[S]ome [A]ccurate [I]nformation
is [B]etter than [N]o [Information [Alt [A]II": Arguments Against an Exception to
the Learned Intermediary Doctrine Based on Direct-To-Consumer Advertising, 78
OR. L. REV. 605, 633 n.135 (1999):
[s]ince the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court has recognized that advertising is
protected by the First Amendment. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the Court held
that prescription drug prices could be advertised and that a state ban to the
contrary was unconstitutional. The Court based its holding, in part, on the
belief that commercial speech is often more important to consumers than
political speech and is thus deserving of First Amendment protection.
(citation omitted).
4' 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (holding that defendant's violation of the city Sanitary
Code by distribution of a two-sided pamphlet that advertised his submarine as a pub-
lic attraction on one side, and protested the city's prohibition against mooring a sub-
marine at defendant's preferred pier, on the other, was not undone by defendant's
[Vol. 15:165
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rently, however, commercial speech enjoys extensive protection, es-
pecially in light of recent Supreme Court cases. 6 Contemporary
commercial speech regulation began with Virginia Pharmacy Board
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council (Virginia Pharmacy).47 In
Virginia Pharmacy, the Supreme Court held that speech proposing a
commercial transaction is protected under the First Amendment both
as (1) a commercial right to advertise and (2) a public right to receive
advertising.48 Following Virginia Pharmacy, the Supreme Court, in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm 'n
(Central Hudson)49 determined that freedom of commercial speech
enables consumers to determine their best interests based on informa-
tion gleaned through open communication.50  Accordingly, the Su-
preme Court has rejected governmental suppression of commercial
information as paternalistic. 51 The Court has taken a firm stance in
favor of commercial expression, even where the content proclaimed to
be factual and informative is, in actuality, incomplete.52
right to commercial speech under the First Amendment because protecting commer-
cial speech in such a situation would open the door to circumvention of this and other
city ordinances).
46 E.g. Steven G. Brody & Jeanette M. Viggiano, Summary of Major 2002
Commercial Speech Developments, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW 2002, at 379, 381-386
(PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 726, 2002) (summarizing 2002
commercial speech Supreme Court cases).
47 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
48 Id. at 757 ("If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to
receive the advertising, and it may be asserted by these appellees.").
'9 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
50 Id. at 561-562 ("The First Amendment, as applied to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment, protects commercial speech from unwarranted governmental
regulation. Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the
speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest
possible dissemination of information") (citation omitted). See also Linmark Assocs.,
Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92 (1977) (stating that the "free flow of commercial
information" is an important societal interest regardless of the commercial subject
matter).
51 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 ("[P]eople will perceive their own best
interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is
to open the channels of communication, rather than to close them," citing Va. Phar-
macy, 425 U.S. at 770.).
52 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 ("Even when advertising communicates
only an incomplete version of the relevant facts, the First Amendment presumes that
some accurate information is better than no information at all," citing Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 374 (1977).).
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Though it has been modified by more recent cases,53 the test
adopted by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson is the standard to be
applied to cases wherein commercial speech is contested. First, the
test demands an inquiry into whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment. In order to survive the Central Hudson test:
(1) the speech must concern lawful activity and must not be mislead-
ing; (2) the government interest in regulating commercial speech must
be substantial; (3) regulation of the speech must directly advance the
government interest asserted; and (4) regulation must be no more ex-
tensive than necessary to serve the interest asserted. 54 The Supreme
Court has used this test to reach a variety of outcomes, some protect-
ing the freedom of commercial speech, and some favoring regulation
of speech. 55 Significantly, recent Supreme Court cases, such as 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island56 and Thompson v. Western States
53 See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (renumber-
ing the governmental balancing test as part one and considering the inquiry into the
legality and truth of the speech as a prerequisite to applying the test); and Brody,
supra note 46, at 383 (citing Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002)
(moving closer to strict scrutiny review of regulations limiting commercial speech by
rejecting the paternalism underlying commercial speech limitations and placing the
burden on the government to show why it did not adopt plaintiffs given alternative to
regulating commercial speech.).
54 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-66; Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner,
Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627, 630 (1990); see also
DeVore, supra note 21, at 349.
55 Compare San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 539 (1987) (supporting a federal trademark statute's restric-
tions on use of the word "Olympic" in commerce as "not broader than Congress rea-
sonably could have determined to be necessary"); and Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S., at
618 (upholding a Florida ethical rule forbidding plaintiffs' attorneys from soliciting
business through direct mailings to accident victims and their families in the first 30
days after the tragedy) with those favoring free speech over regulation, City of Cin-
cinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 412 (holding that Cincinnati's city-
wide ban on news-racks distributing advertising pamphlets was an infringement of
commercial speech); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 478 (1995) (affirm-
ing the Tenth Circuit's holding that a regulation which prohibited beer labels from
indicating the alcohol content advanced no government interest in "a direct and mate-
rial way" and, as such, violated the First Amendment protection of commercial
speech); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (finding Rhode
Island prohibitions against advertising the price of alcoholic beverages unconstitu-
tional); and Thompson, 535 U.S. at 357 (permitting pharmacists to advertise specific
compounded drugs and strengthening commercial speech rights by emphasizing that
regulating speech must be a last resort and must not serve paternalistic ends). See
also DeVore, supra note 21, at 349 (canvassing the history of commercial speech in
the Supreme Court).
56 See 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 503:
Precisely because bans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech
rarely seek to protect consumers from either deception or overreaching,
they usually rest solely on the offensive assumption that the public will re-
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Medical Center 7 (Western States) have substantially expanded the
right to commercial speech. Western States is especially relevant not
only because it was recently decided, but also because the case con-
sidered regulation of drug advertising.
In Western States, decided in 2002, the Court considered the con-
stitutionality of portions of the Food and Drug Administration Mod-
ernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) 8 The challenged portions of the
FDAMA concerned regulations on drug compounding. Drug com-
pounding is the alteration or weakening of prescription drugs on a
doctor's instruction.5 9  The FDAMA restrictions at issue prohibited
pharmacists from advertising certain compounded drugs.6 ° Affirming
the Ninth Circuit, the Court invalidated the speech restrictions in the
FDAMA and rejected paternalistic regulations of commercial speech
as per se invalid.61 The court focused on the fourth prong of the Cen-
tral Hudson test and found that the fourth prong was not satisfied be-
cause means unrelated to speech restrictions could address the State
interest in keeping people from convincing doctors to proscribe un-
necessary drugs.62 Significantly, however, the first prong of the Cen-
tral Hudson test was not at issue, as the government did not argue that
the advertisements at issue were misleading.63 This leaves open a
possibility for protecting consumers' rights to truth in advertising
through common law where statues, such as the Lanham Act, do not
provide consumers with standing.
Another recent Supreme Court opinion is particularly relevant to
this paper. In Lorillard v. Reilly,64 the court held that Massachusetts
unfair or deceptive trade regulations on tobacco sales to minors with-
stood a Central Hudson analysis. 65 Specifically, the Massachusetts
regulations prohibited unattended self-service displays of tobacco
products in order to prevent minors from accessing tobacco products
without interacting directly with a salesperson.66 The majority rea-
soned that the State had a substantial interest in curtailing tobacco
spond "irrationally" to the truth. The First Amendment directs us to be es-
pecially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for
what the government perceives to be their own good.
(citations omitted).
5 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
I ld. at 360.
59 Brody, supra note 53, at 382.60 Thompson, 535 U.S. at 360.
61 Id. at 377.
62 Id. at 376.
63 Id. at 368.
6' 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
65 Id. at 570.
66 Id. at 569.
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sales to minors and that the State's means were narrowly-tailored
where the regulations related to product placement and not necessarily
expression. Further, the Court emphasized that the State legislature
left open alternative means for vendors to communicate information
about products and for consumers to glean product information.67
Lorillard may be construed as allowing an exception, for minors,
to the rule that paternalistic regulations are per se invalid under the
First Amendment. 68 But it is also clear that the court held open the
possibility that regulations, notwithstanding their arguable paternalis-
tic nature, will pass First Amendment muster as long as the State in-
terest is substantial, another legal interest is advanced (i.e. preventing
underage purchase of tobacco), and other avenues of commercial
communication are left open for the advancement of commercial
communication and consumer information.69 What is clear, however,
is that the Court specifically chose not to do away with the Central
Hudson test as the benchmark for First Amendment decision-
making.
70
In sum, drug companies, like most for-profit enterprises, have an
interest in freedom of speech in advertising. The law protects com-
mercial speech under the First Amendment as long as it survives the
Central Hudson test, which attempts to regulate false information and
balance freedom of commercial expression with government inter-
ests.71 Remember, however, that under the Central Hudson test and
statutes discussed in Part I, speech which is false, misleading or illegal
may be regulated by the government. However, recent expansion of
pharmaceutical companies' rights to communicate through DTCA,72
and even more recent Supreme Court decisions narrowing government
control under the Central Hudson test,73 are encouraging an expand-
ing right to commercial expression. One specific commercial interest
in expression is the control and maintenance of branding through
trademarks.
67 Id. at 568-71.
68 See id. at 580-81 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment).
69 Id. at 570-71.
70 Id. at 554-55.
71 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Conm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) ("[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of com-
mercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.").
72 See McLellan, supra note 6, at 1951 ("Since [1997 when regulations on
DTCA were relaxed], DTC advertising, much of it on television, has risen by nearly
150%.").
73 See supra notes 54, 57-63 and accompanying text.
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2. DTCA Facilitates Public and Private Benefits Afforded by Trade-
mark Law
Significantly, and as discussed below, trademark policy is rooted
in considerations of both consumer and commercial interests. Incon-
gruently, despite this emphasis on consumer interests, as discussed
above, the Lanham Act, which governs trademark law at the statutory
level, does not provide a private cause of action for consumers. The
following section will explore how companies' protection of branding
through trademark and consumers' interests in commercial informa-
tion are furthered through direct to consumer advertising.
From a business perspective, drug companies may attain a return
on their research and development investments by establishing a
trusted brand name which consumers request from their physicians.
Drug companies expend considerable capital and effort in order to
create and promote a brand whose strength conveys a positive mes-
sage to a broad base of consumers. 74 In fact, a pharmaceutical con-
sulting firm, IMS Health, reported that the pharmaceutical industry
spent more than $19 billion in 2001 on advertising, including
DTCA.75 This figure only includes spending in the United States.
Therefore, drug companies often request that the FDA remark on
"draft" advertisements in order to avoid wasting resources on adver-
tisements that will be discontinued by the government.76 Accordingly,
a rule requiring review would not only be the logical next step but
also should be initiated in order to protect both consumer interests and
the financial interests of corporations.
The typical consumer advantages conceived by trademark law are
specious with regard to drug advertising. For example, one benefit of
DTCA may be that consumers gain a short-cut to remembering which
drug company provided them with a quality cure for their ailment.
While this is considered a benefit to consumers of most products, be-
cause their search costs are decreased when making a repeat purchase
or when purchasing from a company with whom they have associated
a measure of quality, this benefit is not so strong with DTCA of
pharmaceuticals. With prescription drugs, the doctor, not the con-
sumer/patient, ultimately makes the determination of treatment, and
74 See Wosifiska, supra note 4, at 1 (discussing the large amount of capital
spent on DTCA).
75 Antonuccio, supra note 13, at 1029 (discussing drug companies' excep-
tional marketing spending).
76 Accordingly, a rule requiring review would not only be the logical next
step but also should be initiated from the point of view of protecting specific con-
sumer interests as well as the financial interests of corporations. See Wosiiiska, supra
note 4, at 8 n. 11.
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patients cannot purchase parescription medications on their own, with-
out first visiting a doctor.
The American market economy encourages advertising because,
for example, the economics-driven legal regime of trademark law
provides greatest protection for those companies who have established
strong brand names. 78  Further, a trade name's strength is partially
defined by how readily and widely recognized it is in the public
mind.79 Indeed, the spectrum which determines the strength of a word
used as a trademark considers whether a word has developed "secon-
dary meaning. 80 A trademark acquires secondary meaning when the
public associates the product bearing the trademark with a specific,
even if anonymous, source.8 ' Advertising and sale in commerce are
necessary for a trademark to achieve secondary meaning. 82 For an
example of how secondary meaning works, take Chevron gasoline.
The word "Chevron" means v-shaped in English. However, after use
of the term in advertising and in the marketplace, consumers identify
Chevron with a specific source of gasoline. Through this association,
the owners of the Chevron trademark can direct consumers to their
resources and services. Also, consumers can depend on a particular
quality of service when patronizing a Chevron station. Once secon-
dary meaning is achieved in the marketplace, a trademark receives a
wider girth of protection against any potential or actual infringers.8 3
Specifically, a company is unlikely to successfully claim that it unin-
tentionally infringed a well-known mark, and an infringer can bring
77 On the other hand, it seems the very reason that drug companies spend
enormous capital on DTCA is in order to encourage patients to lead their physicians
to a branded prescription.
78 James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276
(7th Cir. 1976):
A mark that is strong because of its fame or its uniqueness, is more likely to
be remembered and more likely to be associated in the public mind with a
greater breadth of products or services, than is a mark that is weak because
relatively unknown or very like similar marks or very like the name of the
product.
79 Id.
80 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc. 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d
Cir. 1976) (defining the spectrum of mark strength).
81 KINNEY & LANGE, P.A., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW FOR BUSINESS
LAWYERS § 10.4.1 (1996) ("A trademark... acquires secondary meaning when con-
sumers associate the product with a single, perhaps anonymous, source.").
82 Id. ("The two primary ways of showing secondary meaning are by demon-
strating extensive advertising, which presumably results in extensive recognition, or
by conducting a survey.").
83 See generally MATTHEW BENDER, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE
(MB) § 2.09 (2003) (discussing trademark strength and secondary meaning).
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84fewer defenses against a mark with secondary meaning. In order to
maximize protection from infringement under the Lanham Act, a
mark must be registered and "used" in commerce.85 A mark can even
gain "incontestability" through use.
86
From a marketing perspective, one private interest protected by
trademark law is "brand equity" achieved through broad recognition
of a trademark or trade name. Brand equity is
the positive differential effect that knowing the brand name
has on customer response to the product or service. High
brand equity allows a company to enjoy reduced marketing
costs because of high brand awareness and loyalty, gives a
company more leverage in bargaining with distributors and
retailers, permits the [company] to charge more because the
brand has higher perceived quality, allows the [company] to
more easily launch extensions because the brand has high
credibility, and offers some defense against price competi-
tion.87
Among the other benefits of a strong trademark are (1) source-
identification, whereby a consumer identifies a particular brand with a
manufacturer; (2) protection of goodwill, which can be defined as
creating and protecting consumers' positive mental association with a
good;88 and (3) the ability to protect a trademark which has become
famous from dilution. Dilution is the erosion of a trademark's
84 A policy rationale for a wider girth of protection for trade names which
have achieved secondary meaning or are fanciful, non-standard English words is, in
part, because it is undesirable that a merchant should have a monopoly on the com-
mon descriptive use of a word. For example, "Apple" is protected when it arbitrarily
applies to computers but would go unprotected if applied to an orchard.
Defenses such as claiming that a trademark has become generic or claim-
ing good faith limited geographic rights to a trademark are factually weaker when the
senior user of a trademark mark has achieved secondary meaning.
85 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2000):
[T]he right of the registrant to use such registered mark in commerce for the
goods or services on or in connection with which such registered mark has
been in continuous use for five consecutive years subsequent to the date of
such registration and is still in use in commerce, shall be incontestable ....
86 Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 192 (1985)
("Incontestable status provides, subject to the provisions of § 15 and 33(b) of the
Lanham Act, 'conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the regis-
tered mark .... ').
87 KOTLER, supra note 7, at 218.88 See generally JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION LAW 44-47 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing the general properties of trademark
excerpted from WILLIAM BORCHARD, A TRADEMARK IS NOT A PATENT OR A
COPYRIGHT (2000)).
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uniqueness. 89 And because trademarks generally increase in strength
with public association between the mark and the good to which it
refers, drug companies have an interest in making their trademark
known to a broad audience. Through DTCA, drug companies can
gain increased trademark strength because patients, as well as doctors,
come to know which drug companies produce which pharmaceuticals.
Capitalizing on this, DTCA on television and in print includes the
manufacturer's brand name as well as the name of the branded drug.
There is also a consumer, or public, interest protected by trade-
mark law. A cause of action for trademark infringement protects
business investments through assurance that no second-comer can
trade off the goodwill9" established by a company's labor and expendi-
ture. 91 Accordingly, one policy rationale behind protecting trade-
marks is that consumers benefit from trademarks due to decreased
search costs. 92 For example, a consumer who comes to expect and
89 Allegedly unconcerned with consumer confusion and concerned entirely
with the value of the trademark owner's property, dilution is perhaps the most prop-
erty-oriented of a trademark holder's intellectual property rights. Dilution stands on
uncertain ground, however, since the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of a dilution
claim. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432-35 (2003) ("[T]he
mere fact that consumers mentally associate a junior user's mark with a famous mark
is not sufficient to establish actionable dilution). See also Frank I. Schechter, The
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 825-31 (1927) (de-
scribing dilution as a novel rationale for protecting trademarks as property).
90 Goodwill can be defined as a reputation for consistent quality.
91 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000) (creating a cause of action for trademark in-
fringement):
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in con-
nection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark
and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation
to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertise-
ments intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services
on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive,
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided.
92 See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968):
Preservation of the trademark as a means of identifying the trademark
owner's products, implemented both by the Lanham Act and the common
law, serves an important public purpose. It makes effective competition
possible in a complex, impersonal marketplace by providing a means
through which the consumer can identify products which please him and
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appreciate a certain quality from Crest toothpaste can efficiently make
buying decisions with regard to oral hygiene products. In this way, a
trademark acts as a shorthand guarantee of quality. Trademark in-
fringement suits, then, protect not only a business interest in commu-
nicating that quality to the consumer, but also the consumer interest in
spending less time searching for a quality product or service.93 In
addition to benefits associated with trademark law, consumers may
directly benefit from the informational content of DTCA. The follow-
ing section explores whether information in DTCA does, in fact, pro-
vide a benefit to consumers.
3. The Advantages of DTCA to Consumers: Education and Autonomy
One rationale for DTCA is that consumers benefit from the in-
formation in DTC advertisements. Arguably, the product information
empowers patients to participate more actively in their healthcare,
which leads to greater autonomy.
In order for the information in the DTCA to benefit consumers,
consumers must have a need for the information. In American Atti-
tudes Toward and Willingness to Use Psychiatric Medications, Doctor
Thomas Croghan et al. argue that those in need of treatment for men-
tal illness are under-served.94 According to the authors, in any given
year, up to 44 million Americans suffer from a diagnosable mental
illness.95 The authors' study, however, reveals that skepticism shades
Americans' attitudes about medical treatment for psychological disor-
ders.96 Indeed, while respondents to the study claimed that they be-
lieved psychiatric medications to be effective, their responses revealed
that they were unlikely to take such medications.97 The authors de-
reward the producer with continued patronage. Without some such method
of product identification, informed consumer choice, and hence meaningful
competition in quality, could not exist.
(citations omitted).
93 However, in the case of advertising pharmaceuticals, it is arguably doctors,
and not patients, who conduct the search. Though patients may suggest a given pre-
scription drug, doctors do the ultimate prescribing. This will be considered in greater
depth later in the analysis, when considering consumers' interests in DTCA.
94 Thomas W. Croghan et al., American Attitudes Toward and Willingness to
Use Psychiatric Medications, 191 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 166, 166 (2003).
9' Id. at 166.
96 Id. at 172.
9' Id. at 173:
The data presented here replicate a gap seen in earlier studies - Americans
believe that psychiatric medications are effective at relieving symptoms as-
sociated with mental disorders, yet they are relatively unwilling to use them
in most situations. These findings are consistent with research documenting
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termined no complete explanation for this gap between attitude and
behavior.98 However, several theories were suggested. One theory is
that the stigma surrounding mental illness deters disclosure.99 Accord-
ingly, the authors argue that, despite the research and analysis of other
experts, I00 DTCA does not necessarily lead to unnecessary use of
prescription drugs.' 0' On the contrary, advertising may help to re-
move the stigma associated with mental impairment. As a result,
people may become more willing to consider helpful treatment.
The FDA conducted a survey in 2002 wherein it polled about 500
physicians to determine the effect of DTCA on the physician-patient
relationship. 0 2 The results became available in the fall of 2003. Ac-
cording to the survey, "[s]ome physicians thought the ads made their
patients more aware of possible treatments." 10 3 Also, "[m]any physi-
cians reported that they thought DTC ads made their patients more
involved in their health care."'1 4 These results support the argument
that DTCA induces consumers to become more autonomous and in-
formed about how, or if, to treat their ailments. Further, many studies
suggest that patients are more open to new treatments when they are
informed about their disease 10 5 and that advertising's suggestion that
depression is a widespread condition will de-stigmatize mental illness
over time. 10 6  In theory, this would lead to greater communication
about and necessary treatment of mental illness.
However, physicians have reported the detriments of patients'
perceived empowerment through incomplete information from
DTCA. One doctor compared his physician's office to a fast food
drive-through window whereby patients expect their orders to be ex-
actly and expeditiously filled.10 7 Others describe the patient/physician
the discrepancy between the level of need for mental health services and the
actual use of medical treatments.
98 Id.
99 Id. ("[T]he gap may be explained in part by the stigma associated with
mental illness that evokes fear and embarrassment about disclosure, deterring persons
from seeking treatment.").
100 The authors cite to Thomas W. Croghan, The Controversy of Increased
Spending for Antidepressants, 20 HEALTH AFF. 129, 130 (2001).
l Croghan, supra note 94, at 173.
.02 Hearing, supra note 9, at 47.
103 Id. at 48.
14 id.
105 Mark A. Graber & Michelle Weckmann, Pharmaceutical Company Inter-
net Sites As Sources of Information About Antidepressant Medications, 16 CNS
DRUGS 419,422 (2002).
106 Id.
107 Linda F. Hogle, Claims and Disclaimers: Whose Expertise Counts?, 21
MED. ANTHROPOLOGY 275, 287 (2002) (examining how FDA regulations have
changed the exchange of medical knowledge and impacted physician practices).
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relationship since DTCA as a negotiation, rather than a counseling
and treatment session, where patients are open to help from their doc-
tor." 8 In the next section, this note will explore in more depth some
disadvantages of DTCA, specifically with respect to consumers with
mental illness.
IV. DISADVANTAGES OF DTCA
This section will examine case studies which illuminate some dis-
advantages of DTCA vis-A-vis those who may suffer from a mental
illness. These disadvantages include (1) financial conflicts of interest
which taint the information consumers, potential and actual patients,
receive via DTCA; and (2) the medicalization of mental and/or emo-
tional frailty.
1. Financial Conflicts of Interest and Their Effect on Educating the
Consumer
Though one benefit of DTCA is its informative value, it is impor-
tant to understand that DTC ads do not provide information as a pub-
lic service. 09 Even with a physician acting as the gatekeeper to pre-
scription drugs, 10 consumers' interest in truth in DTCA deserves vigi-
lant protection. As discussed above, a pro-DTCA approach may de-
scribe the advertisements as informative because they enable consum-
ers to counter-balance market inefficiencies such as "imperfect con-
sumer information.""' To illustrate, when a traditional firm adver-
tises, the informative content of the advertisement will, theoretically,
help consumers make efficient choices about how to allocate their
scarce resources of time and money." 12 The goal of informative ad-
vertising is to acquaint consumers with new products or to educate
consumers about the new attributes of existing products.1 3 However,
108 Id. at 287-88.
109 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1979) ("[A]ssociations of trade
names with price and quality information can be manipulated by the users of trade
names [and] there is a significant possibility that trade names will be used to mislead
the public.").
"10 See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966):
"[T]he purchaser's doctor is a learned intermediary between the purchaser
and the manufacturer. If the doctor is properly warned of the possibility of a
side effect in some patients, and is advised of the symptoms normally ac-
companying the side effect, there is an excellent chance that injury to the
patient can be avoided.
111 Wosifiska, supra note 4, at 4 (stating the benefits of "informative" adver-
tising).
112 id.
113 KOTLER, supra note 7 at 312.
2005]
HEAL TH MA TRIX
drug companies, like all firms that advertise, ultimately seek financial
gain, so with the information comes an attempt to persuade." 14 Per-
suasive advertising targets consumer desires and vulnerabilities and
ultimately seeks to create changed or new consumer needs." 5 This
section is concerned with how DTCA affects the particular vulner-
abilities of consumers who may suffer from mental illness.
Attention to magazines, billboards, television, and radio will re-
veal that those who may suffer from mental illness are targeted heav-
ily by pharmaceutical companies. Further, research on DTCA spend-
ing exposes drug companies' focus on marketing psychotropic
drugs. 16 Indeed, a study supported by the Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation chose antidepressants as one of five therapeutic classes to
track in order to study DTCA across the pharmaceutical industry be-
cause they are among the most heavily advertised and best-selling
pharmaceuticals." 7  It seems the marketing efforts are succeeding,
since sales of antidepressants are exceptionally high. A December
2003 article in the American Psychologist points out that antidepres-
sants are now the "top selling drug category."' 18 And, of all the mar-
keting strategies used to sell their pharmaceuticals," 19 DTCA is
114 Id.
115 Wosifiska, supra note 4, at 4-5 ("[Persuasive advertising] alters consum-
ers' tastes and creates spurious product differentiation and brand loyalty.").
116 The Oxford English Dictionary offers a helpful definition of psychotropic:
"Affecting a person's mental state; psychoactive ....... THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 770 (2d ed. 1989), available at http://dictionary.oed.com/entrance.dtl
(last visited March 1, 2004). For studies discussing marketing focus on psychotropics
see supra notes 110-11.
117 Meredith B. Rosenthal et al., Promotion of Prescription Drugs to Con-
sumers, 346 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 498, 499 (2002) (These drugs were studied specifi-
cally "because they rank among the top 20 therapeutic classes in terms of sales and
contain at least one product for which there is substantial spending on [DTCA].").
118 Antonuccio, supra note 13, at 1029.
119 Id. at 1029-30:
Consumer Reports has documented drug industry marketing strategies
("Miracle Drugs," 1992; "Pushing Drugs," 1992) that include but are not
limited to the following: (a) giving free samples and information to doctors,
(b) advertising in medical journals, (c) using "ask your doctor" media ads
aimed directly at the consumer... (d) sponsoring promotional dinner meet-
ings with substantial gifts or even cash provided to attendees, (e) paying
consultants to speak at scientific meetings in which it is possible to circum-
vent FDA guidelines that require disclosure of side effects, (f) funding only
those research projects that have a high likelihood of producing favorable
results for a particular drug company's product.. . (g) terminating negative
studies before they are ready for publication, (h) involving large numbers of
physicians in studies not intended to yield publishable information but sim-
ply designed to yield maximum product exposure, (i) including "look-alike"
publication supplements (i.e., non-peer-reviewed articles underwritten by a
drug company that appear in a special issue of a peer-review journal) in
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thought to have the "most profound effect.' 120 To summarize, those
with mental illness are now heavily targeted by DTCA and antide-
pressants are marketed aggressively so that they remain among the
top-selling prescription drugs.1
21
The recent FDA study highlights some of the detrimental ways in
which DTCA efforts are affecting prescribing habits of physicians.
22
On a positive note, forty percent of physicians reported their belief
that patients are able to comprehend the possible negative side-effects
and risks associated with a drug from the DTCA alone.123  However,
many physicians reported that they feel "pressure to prescribe some-
thing when patients mention DTC ads. 124 Eight percent of physicians
admitted that in past interactions with patients who requested a spe-
cific drug by brand name they felt "very pressured" to prescribe the
exact drug requested. 125 Twenty percent felt "somewhat pressured" in
the same circumstances. 26 Many doctors felt that they needed to pro-
vide patients with information in addition to that which patients par-
roted from the direct-to-consumer ads. 127 About seventy-five percent
of physicians reported that their understanding of DTC ads is that they
cause patients to overestimate the efficacy of the drugs advertised.
28
One could argue that, given these statistics, there may be a Lorillard-
type 129exception to the per se invalidity of paternalistic regulation of
speech where mentally impaired patients bombarded with DTCA are
unable to decipher truth in the ads. A stronger argument, however,
and one that avoids this sort of paternalism-within-paternalism, is that
professional journals, (j) offering to pay journalists to cover their products,
(k) offering pre-packaged information for journalists in the form of video
news releases that give the appearance of having been independently devel-
oped.., and (1) helping to fund patient advocacy and other public interest
groups so the consumer group appears to be publicly carrying the banner of
a particular drug.
(citations omitted).
120 Id. at 1030.
121 Id. at 1029-30.
122 Although the study is interpreted by the FDA to reveal the positive effects
that DTCA has had on the physician/patient relationship, the results reproduced
herein depict some of the negative effects of DTCA on that relationship. It is impor-
tant to emphasize that the results are based on physicians' perceptions. Reporting on
those perceptions is constrained by what physicians are willing to admit.
123 Hearing, supra note 9, at 48.
124 id.
125 id.
126 Id.
127 id.
128 Id.
129 See discussion of Lorillard v. Reilly in Part II, subpart 1 of this note.
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misleading information in DTCA fails the first prong of the Central
Hudson test.
A previous study supported by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foun-
dation noted that research justifies DTCA critics' fears about wasteful
and improper prescribing.' 30 In fact, patients' demands for specific
drugs have been reported as the most serious hindrance to appropriate
prescribing. 13 1 Where a doctor has understandable financial concerns
about acquiring and maintaining patient relationships, s/he may not be
the buffer once hoped for between biased information in DTCA and
the self-prescription of drugs.
32
Though DTCA does contain some information for consumers, this
information is slanted. The pharmaceutical industry wields significant
financial influence over the studies and clinical information that pa-
tients ultimately receive,1 33 so the scope and depth of pure information
available to consumers is limited by corporate interests.1 34 For exam-
ple, Upjohn, which produces the drug Xanax, supported a much-
anticipated study on treatment of panic disorder and agoraphobia. 35
However, when it appeared that the study's results would show that
Xanax actually interfered with treatment, Upjohn not only suddenly
130 Rosenthal, supra note 118, at 498.
131 Id. at 503 ("[C]oncern may be justified by previous findings that demand
by patients is the most common reason offered by physicians for inappropriate pre-
scribing.").
132 Making physicians directly accountable to patients, the learned intermedi-
ary doctrine shields drug companies from liability to patients where drug companies
have provided physicians with adequate warning of adverse effects. Armed with
information from pharmaceutical companies, the physician acts as the learned inter-
mediary between drug companies and consumer-patients. See generally Mitchell S.
Berger, Note, A Tale of Six Implants: The Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Norplant Case
and the Applicability of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to Direct-to-Consumer
Drug Promotion, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525, 528 (2000) (referring to the chief ration-
ale for the learned intermediary doctrine: "that the doctor rather than the patient
'makes the decision to use a particular prescription drug"') (citation omitted).
133 Antonuccio, supra note 13, at 1030:
It is difficult to think of any arena involving information about medications
that does not have significant industry financial or marketing influences.
Industry financial ties extend to federal regulatory agencies, professional
organizations, continuing medical education, researchers, media experts,
and consumer advocacy organizations. Such widespread corporate interests
may contribute to self-selecting academic oligarchies, narrowing the range
of acceptable clinical and scientific information or inquiry.
See, e.g., Giovanni A. Fava, All Our Dreams Are Sold, 67 PSYCHOTHERAPY &
PSYCHOSOMATICS, 191, 192 (1998) (discussing the prevalence and effects of conflict
of interest, specifically in clinical and scientific trials which are published in medical
journals).
134 Antonuccio, supra note 13, at 1030.
"' Id. at 1030.
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ended support for the study but also invited other professionals who
had previously supported the study to critique it.
13 6
Another example of how conflicts of interest between physicians'
education and drug company sponsorships influences the content
which is ultimately included in DTC advertisements is evident in psy-
chiatrist David Healy's rescinded offer to head the depression re-
search unit at the University of Toronto.137 In the early months of the
2000, Healy accepted an offer to head the Mood and Anxiety Disor-
ders Program within the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health
(CAMH) at the University of Toronto. 138 In meetings with other de-
partment heads as part of Healy's recruiting process, Healy was clear
about his research and publications on controversial effects of Selec-
tive Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs). 139 However, when Healy
gave a speech outlining his book which was to be published by Har-
vard University Press on the topic of psychopharmacology, he pub-
licly spoke of the link between SSRIs and suicidal behavior. 140 After
the lecture, Healy was reprimanded by David Goldbloom, Physician
in Chief of the CAMH. 41 Goldbloom emphasized that Healy should
not have suggested that Eli Lilly knew of the link between Prozac and
suicide. 42 Healy claims that he did not make such a suggestion in his
lecture. 43 By the following week, when Healy gave an almost identi-
cal lecture at Cornell Medical School, CAMH had already rescinded
his offer as department head. 44 It later became clear that CAMH can-
celled the job offer because the center was funded, in large part, by
Lilly, SmithKline Beecham (now GlaxoSmithKline) and other phar-
maceutical companies. 145 Indeed, when Healy sued the university in
the first ever breach of academic freedom suit, the university clarified
that Healy's misfortune was linked to "representations to the univer-
sity by academics with close contacts to industry."'
146
The pharmaceutical industry also has more direct financial inter-
ests in psychotropic drug research. In January 2003, the Journal of
the American Medical Association (JAMA) published a meta-analysis
136 Id. at 1031.
137 Id.
138 David Healy, Conflicting Interests in Toronto: Anatomy of a Controversy
at the Interface of Academia and Industry, 45 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 250, 252
(2002).
139 Id.
140 Id. at 253-54; see also Antonuccio, supra note 13, at 1031.
141 Healy, supra, note 139, at 253-54.
142 Id. at 254.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 255.
146 Antonuccio, supra note 13, at 1031.
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of thirty-seven existing studies on the effects of conflict of interest 147
in biomedical research. 148 The results of the study suggest that bio-
medical research is heavily influenced by both financial and non-
financial ties to industry. 49 In fact, the study found that nearly one
quarter of biomedical researchers have ties to the pharmaceutical in-
dustry. 150 These ties include financial sponsorship of research, indus-
try gifts related to research such as discretionary funds and biomate-
rials, and "dual affiliations" with companies and research universities.
Lead research authors (34%) and investigators (7.6%) even had per-
sonal financial ties such as paid consulting and/or speaking engage-
ments, equity in pharmaceutical companies, company-owned patents,
and advisory board positions. 5' Importantly, this study and others
have determined that industry sponsorship leads to pro-industry con-
clusions regarding experimental drugs. 152  Moreover, though peer-
reviewed journals have been found to manage conflicts of interest
through disclosure policies, even amid journals with explicit disclo-
sure guidelines, few articles actually included disclosures of conflicts
of interest. 53  In sum, DTC advertising claims must be founded in
research and testing in order to be deemed truthful, 154 but where bi-
ased studies inform any post hoc review of the ads, consumer interests
are not adequately addressed. Further, the fact that DTCA dissemi-
nates information based on biased and/or misleading studies weakens
the commercial speech argument that consumers have an important
147 The researchers defined conflicts of interest as "a set of conditions in
which professional judgment concerning a primary interest (such as a patient's wel-
fare or the validity of research) tends to be unduly influenced by a secondary interest
(such as financial gain)." Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial
Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systemic Review, 289 JAMA 454, 454
(2003).
148 Id.
149 Id. at 463.
151 Id. at 454.
151 Id. at 456.
152 Id. See also Erik Von Elm, Betting Only on Winning Horses or Something
More Sinister: Why Are the Conclusions of Industry Sponsored Studies So Likely to
Be Pro-Industry?, 32 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 481, 482 (2003).
For further confirmation that trials sponsored by firms in the pharmaceutical industry
tend to draw conclusions which are in favor of the drug companies and their prod-
ucts, see Bodil Als-Nielsen et al., Association of Funding and Conclusions in Ran-
domized Drug Trials: A Reflection of Treatment Effect or Adverse Events?, 290
JAMA 921, 921 (2003) (In fifty-one percent of trials which were funded by for-profit
organizations, the drug being studied was determined to be the "treatment of choice."
Compare with only sixteen percent of trials which were funded by non-profit organi-
zations).
153 Bekelman, supra note 148, at 459.
154 See generally Patricia I. Carter, Federal Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in
the United States and Canada, 21 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 215 (1999).
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information interest - namely the ability to participate rationally in
their care - in the dissemination of DTC advertisements.
Finally, drug companies make shrewd use of the information
highway to advertise directly to consumers. The information con-
tained on official 155 sites, such as Pfizer's Zoloft site, has an overt
advertising bend: "Feeling sad? Anxious? Tired? Restless? You
may be suffering from depression or anxiety., 156 Other sites ostensi-
bly contain unbiased information but are funded by pharmaceutical
companies. For example, the website Literature Review Service on
Depression is funded by Solvay Pharmaceuticals, which produces
fluvoxamine, an antidepressant. 157 Also, the Web MD Health and
Depression Resource Center is sponsored in part by Eli Lilly, which
produces the well-known Prozac.' 
58
An article entitled Pharmaceutical Company Internet Sites As
Sources of Information About Antidepressant Medications presented
the results of a study on the value of information on the official web-
sites of several major pharmaceutical companies. 59  Websites pro-
moting Effexor, Remeron, Luvox, Wellbutrin, Celexa, Serzone,
Zoloft, Prozac and Paxil were searched and evaluated. 60 The authors
found that only one site mentions the trade name of other drugs, no
website mentions the cost of the drugs, only one site presents statisti-
cal information on the drug's efficacy, and only one of the sites lists
the percent of the population who may suffer adverse effects from the
drugs. 16 1 Though the selective nature of the consumer-oriented in-
formation on the sites could be put into context by some of the infor-
mation presented for physicians, studies show that only a minority of
Americans read at a level that would allow comprehension of this
information.
62
Indeed, some have suggested that drug company websites should
not be viewed as primarily informative but as direct to consumer ad-
155 Official websites, as opposed to unofficial websites, are those authored
and maintained by the company that manufactures the product(s) featured on the
website.
156 Zoloft.com available at http://www.zoloft.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2004).
157 Antonuccio, supra note 13, at 1035.
158 Id.
159 Graber, supra note 106.
160 Id. at 421.
161 Id
162 Id. (citing, e.g., Ann Foltz & Joan Sullivan, Reading Level, Learning Pres-
entation Preference, and Desire for Information among Cancer Patients, 11 J.
CANCER EDUC. 32 (1996); Terry C. Davis et al., Reading Ability of Parents Compared
with Reading Level of Pediatric Patient Education Materials, 93 PEDIATRICS 460
(1994); and Feleta L. Wilson, Measuring Patients'Ability to Read and Comprehend:
A First Step in Patient Education, NURSING CONNECTIONS, Winter 1995, at 17).
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vertising. 163 As such, the sites can contribute to the harms associated
with DTCA. 64  Ultimately, a study of the informative quality of
pharmaceutical company internet sites reveals that the biased informa-
tion contained therein will complicate consumers' ability to make
intelligent choices regarding the use of prescription drugs.
65
2. Advertising Alchemy: The Power to Turn Non-Medical Problems
into Medical Ones
Medicalization has been defined as a "process by which non-
medical problems become defined and treated as medical problems,
usually in terms of illnesses and disorders.' 66 Some have gone so far
as to term this practice "disease mongering," or searching for treatable
illness in consumers in order to create and expand markets for phar-
maceutical companies. 67 One tactic that advertising, in general, uses
to expand the boundaries of product worth is manipulation of psycho-
logical biases.168 While a more complete examination of advertising's
163 Graber, supra note 106, at 422.
164 Id.:
Direct-to-consumer advertising can pose a problem for health professionals
and lead to suboptimal prescribing. Physicians report that 88% of patients
request a drug by brand name. Fifty percent of these patients would be dis-
appointed if a physician did not give a requested prescription, and up to
25% would look for another physician.
(citations omitted).
165 Id. at 422.
166 Conrad, supra note 14, at 26 (defining and exploring the issue of medicali-
zation).
167 Ray Moynihan et al., Selling Sickness: The Pharmaceutical Industry and
Disease Mongering, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 886, 886 (April 2002) (defining disease mon-
gering as "widening the boundaries of treatable illness in order to expand markets for
those who sell and deliver treatments," and discussing drug companies' sponsorship
and promotion of diseases for financial gain).
168 See Tamara R. Piety, "Merchants of Discontent": An Exploration of the
Psychology of Advertising, Addiction, and the Implications for Commercial Speech,
25 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 377, 402-403 (2001):
[B]ehavioral research has discovered that human beings' capacity to reason,
even when employing what appears to be only 'reason,' is subject to pre-
dictable biases ... it is sufficient to summarize a few of these biases that are
particularly relevant to advertising:
1. Confirmatory Bias. The tendency to misread evidence as confirm-
ing or supporting a hypothesis previously established. This is more
familiarly known as the 'do not confuse me with the facts" bias. ('The
French have a high fat diet and lower rates of coronary heart disease,
so I do not need to worry about fat.')
2. Motivated Reasoning. The tendency to review evidence in such a
way as to arrive at a desired conclusion. This is more familiarly known
as "rationalization." For example, one employing this line of reasoning
might say, 'I am so busy I need to fly first class.'
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manipulation of consumers' psychological biases is beyond the scope
of this paper, some examples specific to DTCA of pharmaceuticals
are instructive.
Advertising relies on human psychology to build brand recogni-
tion and loyalty.' 69 Courts explicitly allow some forms of branding
propaganda. In fact, some courts consider mere puffing in ads to be
"truthful" under the Lanham Act because the viewing audience is not
expected to believe the hyperbolic content of the ad to be true.
170
Also, statements about improved quality of life which are overblown
and ignore common side effects such as sleeplessness and dependency
are very harmful but pass legal muster.' 7' Further, though much of
3. Optimistic Bias. The tendency to underestimate probability that an
undesirable occurrence (divorce, illness, death) will happen to the in-
dividual. This is the "it could not happen to me' bias. (The tobacco in-
dustry relies heavily on this bias.)
4. Cognitive Dissonance. The tendency to disregard evidence of un-
pleasant realities. This is more commonly referred to as 'denial.' (Also
very important to tobacco industry.)
5. The Illusion of Control. The tendency to treat chance events as if ei-
ther they involved skill or there were a causal relationship between the
event and some action by the person. Also known as the 'God com-
plex.' ('The phone always rings when I get in the shower!')
6. Hindsight Bias. The tendency to evaluate probabilities of an occur-
rence higher in the face of a known occurrence of the event than in the
absence of such knowledge. This is commonly known as "Monday
morning quarterbacking' and '20/20 hindsight.'
7. Availability and Representativeness Biases. The tendency both to
calculate probabilities on the basis of the most available, and often the
most vivid, facts and to attribute greater weight to known occurrences
than is appropriate. Advertising may rely heaviest of all on this feature,
as it is the basis for 'brand identification.'
8. Anchoring and Adjustment Effect. The tendency to anchor an esti-
mate on a readily available figure despite knowledge of its irrelevance
to the calculation. (Otherwise known to car salespersons as the 'sticker
price effect.')
(citations omitted).
169 See id. at 409-10 (describing how advertisers rely on human psychology
have consumers develop a relationship to the advertised product).
170 Tylka v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. 96-C1647, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10718,
at *18-*19. (N.D. Ill, July 1, 1999) vacated by Tylka v. Gerber Prods. Co., 211 F.3d
445 (7th Cir. 2000). "Puffing describes a gray area separating nonspecific matters
which cannot rationally support a decision from statements of a more specific, and
thus, deceptive nature." Id.
171 See generally Piety, supra note 168, at 417 (stating that advertising de-
ceives through an unrealistically easy depiction of life); see also Medicating Young
Minds, TIME, Nov. 2003 at 48, 50. "Lexapro is the perfect answer for anxiety all
right, provided you're willing to overlook the fact that it does its work by artificially
manipulating the very chemicals responsible for feeling and thought ... [and has]
such side effects as weight loss and sleeplessness."
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the information contained in DTC ads may be "truthful," according to
the FDA, 172 Consumer Reports has found that many ads understate the
side-effects and risks associated with drugs while exaggerating their
effectiveness, make false claims that the advertised drug is better than
competing drugs, and advocate unapproved uses for available drugs or
endorse drugs which are still being tested for safety and efficacy.
17 3
The following is a series of examples of how pharmaceutical market-
ing manipulates public understanding of what mental illness is in or-
der to gain market share.
A. September Eleventh
Perhaps one of the most pronounced examples of DTCA's ma-
nipulation of the psyche in order to sell psychotropics is the ad that
GlaxoSmithKline ran in the New York Times Magazine following the
events of September 11, 2001.74 The ad for Paxil appeared in Octo-
ber of 2001. In the background, a faceless crowd appeared to walk
with the purpose of everyday New York urgency, while the fore-
ground focused upon the visage and insecure bearing of one pensive
(overwrought?) woman in the crowd. The ad read "Millions suffer
from chronic anxiety. Millions could be helped by Paxil.' 75
Making a convincing argument that such DTCA medicalizes soci-
ety by turning natural human experience into a condition treatable by
prescription drugs, Barbara Mintzes, graduate researcher at the Centre
for Health Services and Policy Research at the University of British
Columbia, wisely queries: although many New Yorkers
no doubt... felt anxious in the aftermath of the attack on the
World Trade Center, experiencing symptoms highlighted in
the advertisement, such as worry, anxiety, or irritability [, at]
what point does an understandable response to distressing life
events become an indication for drug treatment - and market
opportunity?
176
172 Any advertisement which continues to run, for example, in magazines or
on television or radio is considered truthful on its face, as the FDA is charged with
ridding existing DTCA of any false content. The FDA oversees DTCA through its
Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising and Communications (DDMAC). The
DDMAC monitors the information given to consumers through a comprehensive
oversight program. See Hearing, supra note 9 at 33.
173 Antonuccio, supra note 13, at 1030 (citing Free Rein for Drug Ads?,
CONSUMER REP., Feb. 2003, at 33).
174 Mintzes, supra note 5, at 908.
175 Id.
176 Id.
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Additionally, GlaxoSmithKline is not the only drug company to
have launched important marketing efforts surrounding the attacks on
the World Trade Center. During the one month directly following the
tragedy, Pfizer spent twenty-five percent more on its Zoloft marketing
campaigns than it had spent on promoting the product from January to
June, on average.1 77 Zoloft is indicated for, among other things, Gen-
eralized Anxiety Disorder and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
178
Apparently, drug companies are finding that there is an excep-
tional market opportunity for increased sales among healthy individu-
als who may be vulnerable to the suggestion that their coping mecha-
nisms should be sharpened by prescription drugs. In the aggregate,
pharmaceutical companies routinely focus forty percent of marketing
spending on a set of ten drugs at a time.1 79 The ten drugs on which
companies focus are typically the newest, most costly drugs which
will serve large population groups for long periods of time. 80 More-
over, companies are reported to choose advertising campaigns based
on the percentage of patients who are likely to be persuaded to use the
drug and the number of doctors who are likely to prescribe the drug.
181
In recent years, anxiety medications have been the subject of this en-
hanced marketing effort. 
182
B. Scared of Socializing
Another example of medicalizing a potentially commonplace so-
cial or personal difficulty is the case of social phobia. In 1997, Roche
sought a new indication for Aurorix (moclobemide), its antidepres-
sant. 83 Accordingly, the company marketed Aurorix as a medical
therapy for social phobia. 8 4 Roche worked with a patient group, the
Obsessive Compulsive and Anxiety Disorders Foundation of Victoria,
to help promote its drug.18 5 Also as part of its promotion, Roche or-
177 Brendan 1. Koerner, Disorders Made to Order, MOTHER JONES, July-Aug.
2002, at 58, 63.
178 See, e.g., Zoloft.com at http://www.zoloft.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2004).
179 Mintzes, supra note 5, at 908.
180 Id. ("Consistently, around 40% of spending on [DTCA] is on only 10
drugs, mainly new, expensive drugs for long term use by large population groups. In
2000, they were drugs for allergy, ulcer/reflux, anxiety, obesity, arthritis, impotence,
and high cholesterol levels.").
181 Id. ("[M]anufacturers assess whether a product-specific campaign is worth
pursuing based on numbers of potential patients, the "persuadable" percentage, the
proportion of doctors who will prescribe, and the value per patient (return per script
multiplied by the duration of use.").
182 Id.
183 Moynihan, supra note 168, at 888.
184 id.
185 Id.
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dered a press release to announce that over one million Australians
were suffering from undiagnosed social phobia. 8 6 Government fig-
ures available at the same time estimated that the total number of per-
sons with social phobia was close to 370,000.187
A spokesperson for Roche admitted that the company put "a lot of
money into promoting social phobia .... , 88 The emphasis added to
this quote underscores that not only the drug but also the disorder was
specifically promoted to the public, including health professionals, the
media, and prospective patients. It seems the marketing plan suc-
ceeded with regard to the media. Indeed, one newspaper article pub-
lished in 1998, entitled Too Shy for Words claimed that two million
Australians were suffering from social phobia.
89
While this is an example from Australia, the adulation that this
strategy received is of international importance. Indeed, a practical
guidebook entitled Pharmaceutical Marketing applauded the market-
ing model of social phobia. The guide reads
You may even need to reinforce the actual existence of a dis-
ease and/or the value of treating it. A classic example of this
was the need to create recognition in Europe of social phobia
as a distinct clinical entity and the potential of antidepressant
agents such as moclobemide to treat it ... [s]ocial phobia was
recognised in the US and so transatlantic opinion leaders were
mobilised to participate in advisory activities, meetings, pub-
lications etc. to help influence the overall belief in Europe.' 90
(The "needs" highlighted in this excerpt illustrate the primary fo-
cus of most pharmaceutical companies: to market and sell a product.
Such manipulation of consumer demand for prescription drugs car-
ries far weightier consequences than conventional marketing of tradi-
tional consumer goods which, at most, causes consumers to make
unnecessary purchases. Indeed, there is a legitimate fear that we will
become a pill-popping generation, crippled by unnecessary drug ad-
diction, severe side effects, expensive health care costs, and decreased
autonomy.'91
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 According to the foundation's chief at the time, "Roche [was] putting a lot
of money into promoting social phobia ... Roche funded [a] conference [on social
phobia] to help get social phobia known among ... health professionals ... It was a
vehicle to raise awareness with the media too." Id.
189 Id. ("All the media stories seemed to be part of a wider push to change the
common perception of shyness, from a personal difficulty to a psychiatric disorder.").
190 Id. (emphasis added).
191 See generally Piety, supra note 168, at 436-39 (describing advertising's
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C. A SAD Case?
Scholars of legal protection of commercial speech in advertising
have argued that advertising mistakenly assumes that the audience is
made up of "rational actors." 192 However, when drug companies
specifically target those with mental illness, they are, doubtless, savvy
enough to consider how these illnesses affect rationality. Take, for
example, recent accusations that a leading drug company created the
mental condition which has become known as "Social Anxiety Disor-
der" (SAD) in an attempt to boost sales. 193 GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)
has been accused of working with a public relations company to pro-
mote SAD in order to boost sales of Paxil over those of Eli Lilly's
Prozac and Pfizer's Zoloft. 194  In fact, as indicated by a marketing
information sheet, media features of social anxiety increased from
only fifty stories in 1997 and 1998 combined to more than one billion
accounts in 1999 alone. 195  Nearly ninety-six percent of those ac-
counts conveyed the pressing message: "Paxil is the first and only
FDA-approved medication for the treatment of social anxiety disor-
der." 196 Popular culture icons from Rolling Stone magazine to "Ally
McBeal" 197 to Ricky Williams (of NFL fame) aided the advertising
effort to convince the public that their fears were real, had a name,
and could be cured by a drug made by GSK.
Attempting to rebut the concern that drug companies' ads may
reach too broad an audience and persuade those without ailments that
they need an SRRI like Paxil, Murray Stein, a professor of psychiatry
at the University of California in San Diego, queried, "[w]ould some-
body who is not having problems take a medicine that is costly and
has side effects"? 198 Again, however, the recent FDA study suggests
that doctors feel pressure to prescribe medications suggested by their
failure to fully inform consumers of the addictive potential associated with drugs for
psychological conditions); see, e.g., Medicating Young Minds, supra note 172, at 50.
192 See Piety, supra note 169, at 405-07.
193 See Rosenthal, supra note 118, at 503 ("For example, companies may
launch advertising campaigns for products when they are approved for a new indica-
tion, in an attempt to differentiate them from other products in their class (e.g., Paxil
for social anxiety disorder in 1999) .... ").
194 See Shankar Vedantam, Drug Ads Hyping Anxiety Make Some Uneasy,
WASH. POST, July 16, 2001, at Al. For a general discussion of pharmaceutical com-
panies promoting SAD and methods of treatment to the public, see Lisa B. Feldman
& Rafael A. Rivas-Vazquez, Assessment and Treatment of Social Anxiety Disorder,
34 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 396, 399-400 (2003).
195 Vedantam, supra note 195, at Al.
196 Id.
'9' Id. at A6.
198 Id.
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patients and that patients demand such medications.' 99 As such, em-
pirical evidence belies Stein's assertion.
Further, when ads like that for Zolofi (the oval ad discussed at the
beginning of this paper) appeal to any person who has felt sad, a logi-
cal consequence may be that too many people become dependant on
SSRIs to maintain mental well-being. Accordingly, Rex Cowdry,
Medical Director for the National Alliance for the Mentally I11, stated
that "[s]ome marketing seems to imply that huge proportions of the
population need pharmaceutical intervention for relatively common
problems, and in the long run... that may undermine the credibility
of the concept of serious mental illness. '200 Though GSK's product
director has extolled his company's success at uncovering a new mar-
ket niche with the discovery of SAD, American Psychiatric Associa-
tion experts have expressed concern that drug advertisements do not
communicate the difference "between social anxiety and shyness. 2 1
On a positive note, a number of physicians claim marketing ef-
forts like that of GSK have afforded impaired individuals a name and
cure for their ailment.20 2 Furthermore, ads that appeal to a broad au-
dience and which celebrities endorse may help reduce the stigma as-
sociated with mental illness. In addition, physicians' accounts reveal
that many patients suffered from symptoms which were not associated
with any pre-existing disease state. According to advocates of GSK's
work, "[t]hose truly suffering from the condition are profoundly de-
bilitated, refusing promotions or taking jobs as night guards because
they can't stand to be around people., 20 3
Furthermore, some patient advocacy groups trust drug companies'
intentions. Patient advocacy groups such as the American Psychiatric
Association, the Anxiety Disorders Association of America, and a
group called Freedom From Fear, even aided GSK in the move-
204
ment.. These nonprofit groups claim their involvement was fueled
largely by the need for funding to broadcast a "potent public health
199 Kathryn J. Aikin, Power Point Presentation for the FDA Direct-To-
Consumer Promotion: Public Meeting, The Impact of Direct-to-Comsumer Prescrip-
tion Drug Advertising on the Physician-Patient Relationship (Sept. 22, 2003) at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ddmac/aikin/sldO44.htm.
200 Vendantam, supra note 195, at A6.
201 Id. In fact, the sad little oval at the beginning of this essay is a good ex-
ample of this blurred line. The example comes from an ad for Zolofi, which is indi-
cated for SAD but depicts a character that may arguably resemble anyone feeling
rather down or bashful on a given day.
202 id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
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message." 205  However, we know that many consumer advocacy
groups are sponsored by drug companies.20 6
D. Generation Rx2°7
A recent staggering increase in the number of children who are
taking prescription drugs for mental and mood disorders is concomi-
tant with the proliferation of DTCA since 1997 .208 According to one
study, between the years 1997 and 2000, there was an 18.8 percent
increase in pediatric use of SSRIs to treat Major Depressive Disorder
(MDD) and other psychiatric illnesses.20 9 Indeed, prescribing drugs to
205 Id.
206 E.g., Antonuccio, supra note 13, at 1035 ("Grass root organizations are
ostensibly set up to advocate for patients with a particular medical condition ...
However, even casual scrutiny shows that many of these [grass root organizations]
are typically heavily underwritten by the pharmaceutical industry and are designed, at
least in part, to promote drug treatments.").
This article also provides interesting examples of advocacy organizations
that are underwritten by pharmaceutical companies. For example, the National Alli-
ance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) received some $11.7 million support from drug
companies between 1996 and mid-1999. Eli Lilly, manufacturer of Prozac, was the
primary donor, contributing around $2.87 million. Lilly also lent NAMI an executive
from the drug company who then worked from NAMI headquarters. An additional
example is the advocacy organization named Children and Adults With Attention
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (CHADD). In the year 2002, pharmaceutical compa-
nies contributed over $500,000 to CHADD. Novartis, the company which manufac-
tures Ritalin, arguably the most famous treatment for attention deficit disorder, was
among the donating pharmaceutical companies. Id.
One final illustration involves the National Mental Health Awareness
Campaign (NHMAC). The organization was created in 2000 to do away with the
stigma of "fear and shame that is strongly associated with mental disorders." Ko-
erner, supra note 178, at 63. NHMAC especially targets teenagers and offers websites
and toll-free numbers to direct parents and children to mental health care. This or-
ganization is tied to a pharmaceutical lobbying firm named FoxKiser, however. Until
recently, the organization was headquartered in the Washington office of FoxKizer.
Among FoxKizer's clients are AstraZeneca and Bristol-Meyers Squibb. Notably, a
partner at FoxKiser named Michael Waitzkin has a position on NMHAC's board of
directors. Id.
207 Medicating Young Minds, supra note 172, at 50.
208 Id.:
Just a few years ago, psychologists couldn't say with certainty that kids
were even capable of suffering from depression the same way adults do.
Now, according to PhRMA, a pharmaceutical trade group, up to 10% of all
American kids may suffer from some mental illness. Perhaps twice that
many have exhibited some symptoms of depression. Up to a milion others
may suffer from the alternately depressive and manic mood swings of bipo-
lar disorder ... [Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder] rates are explod-
ing, too.
Wo MERRILL GOOZNER & JEFF DELVISCIO, CENTER FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INT.,
SSRI USE IN CHILDREN: AN INDUSTRY-BASED RECORD 2 (2004) (arguing that indus-
20051
HEALTH M TRIX
treat children's mental faculties is being done with such frequency
that some people have justifiably begun to ask, "Are we raising Gen-
eration Rx"?
210
Perhaps the most immediately dangerous facet of children's in-
creased use of prescription drugs to treat mental conditions is the use
of prescription medications such as Paxil (paroxetine), Prozac
(fluoxetine), and Zoloft (sertraline) without regulatory approval.21' In
other words, these drugs have only been approved for adults but are
given to children in decreased doses.212 In fact, only fluoxetine has
been approved by the FDA for child and adolescent use.21 3 Notably,
Dr. Glen Elliot, director of the Langley Porter Psychiatric Institute's
children's center at the University of California, San Francisco, ex-
plained that pediatric use of SSRIs has surpassed knowledge about the
drugs.214 More broadly, however, there lurks the societal issue that
we are becoming a "quick-fix culture," satisfied by short term, "feel-
good" answers to complex problems without concern for the enduring
consequences.215
Dr. Ronald Brown, professor of pediatrics at the Medical Univer-
sity of South Carolina, credits early detection and diagnosis as the
reason for increased pediatric use of SSRIs. However, the trend may
actually have been initiated by pharmaceutical companies' creation of
new classes of drugs and/or creation of new indications for existing
drugs.216 These drugs are introduced into the public with highly visi-
ble and extensive direct-to-consumer advertising campaigns.21 7 Fur-
thermore, doctors report that visits are often too hurried, given that
managed care programs will not pay for longer, "talk-therapy" ses-
sions with patients. 218 As such, one hypothesis in the attempt to de-
termine why pediatric use of prescription drugs has been concomitant
try-sponsored research the benefits of pediatric SSRI use, while academic research
presents many risks and harms associated with such use); see also Medicating Young
Minds, supra note 172, at 51.
210 Medicating Young Minds, supra note 172, at 50.
211 GOOZNER & DELVISCIO, supra note 2 10, at 2.
212 Medicating Young Minds, supra note 172, at 51 ("The practice [of pre-
scribing drugs to children when they are not specifically approved for pediatric use] is
common and perfectly legal but potentially risky. 'We know that kids are not just
little adults,' says Dr. David Fassler, professor of psychiatry at the University of
Vermont. 'They metabolize medications differently."').
213 GOOZNER & DELVISCIO supra note 210, at 2.
214 Medicating Young Minds, supra note 172, at 50 ("[U]sage has outstripped
our knowledge base ... we're experimenting on these kids without tracking the re-
sults.").215 id.
216 See, e.g., Koemer, supra note 178.
217 Medicating Young Minds, supra note 172, at 5 1.
218 Id. at 58.
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with the growth of DTCA is as follows. First, children who suffer
from mental illness, or their parents, view one of the copious adver-
tisements of drugs claiming to heal mental disorders. Then, when
children and their parents visit physicians to request help and mention
the drugs they have seen in DTC ads, hurried harried physicians pre-
scribe adult medication in decreased doses. The FDA's recent survey
evidence that patients are sometimes pressing physicians to meet their
demands for advertised prescriptions helps ground this hypothesis.219
The next section explores what may be done to remedy this and the
other potential harms associated with direct-to-consumer advertising.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although specific groups of people, particularly the mentally ill,
are targeted and may be peculiarly situated to absorb the ills of DTCA
of pharmaceuticals, our capitalist economy advises continuing such
advertising, and the advertising may be protected as commercial
speech under the First Amendment. However, FDA examination of
DTCA should be necessarily preemptive rather than post hoc. In
evaluating the advertisements, the FDA should apply a test to the pro-
posed advertisement that considers Constitutional free speech interests
while making educated attempts to anticipate any harm that consumer
samples have demonstrated.
This balancing test would be akin to a modified Central Hudson
test. To reiterate the test, for the speech at issue to survive part one of
the Central Hudson test, the speech must concern lawful activity and
must not be misleading. Then, the government may regulate the
commercial speech only if the government interest in doing so is sub-
stantial, regulation of the speech would directly advance the govern-
ment interest asserted, and regulation is no more extensive than neces-
sary to serve the interest asserted. When considering whether a given
advertising campaign fails the first part of the Central Hudson test
because it is likely to cause consumers substantial injury that is nei-
ther reasonably avoidable by consumers nor offset by benefits to con-
220
sumers or competition, the FDA should make an initial review of
which audiences are targeted. Practically speaking, the FDA could
ascertain this information by reviewing pharmaceutical companies'
mandatory DTCA submissions. As demonstrated by this paper, one
particular audience which is heavily targeted and may be harmed by
219 Hearing, supra note 9, at 48.
220 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557 (1980).
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the ads' message is the population of persons with actual or potential
mental illness.22'
Then, the FDA should use techniques similar to those used in
marketing research to consider whether the message conveyed to
those audiences is unduly misleading or deceptive. One important
characteristic of marketing research, which should be applied to
evaluating DTCA, is the use of focus groups. A focus group is "a
gathering of six to ten people who spend a few hours with a skilled
moderator to discuss a product, service, organization, or other market-
ing entity. '222 To decrease expenses and improve speed and detail in
response quality, some companies are employing online focus groups
to evaluate their products and services.223 This may be an important
way for the FDA to minimize the cost of focus group research.
Focus groups comprised of members of the targeted and vulner-
able populations, together with social scientists, should evaluate pro-
posed direct-to-consumer advertisements. The groups should be
asked questions to elicit the truthfulness and completeness of the ad-
vertisement. Questions should be tailored to screen for material
which would be illegal as false or misleading, according to the
Lanham Act. Also, questions should be designed to determine
whether group members would ask their doctors for the advertised
medications. Screening in this way will help reveal any subtle mes-
sages in ads and will help the FDA anticipate viewers' reactions and
behavior in relation to the advertisements. Due to concerns over prior
constraints under the First Amendment, the FDA, rather than refusing
a misleading ad, should work with pharmaceutical companies to de-
sign an ad that more truthfully presents drug benefits and side effects
to the targeted consumers.
Concededly, this solution poses problems of paternalism due to
the assumption that consumers cannot readily decipher information in
DTCA on their own. However, as the foregoing portions of this paper
illustrate, advertising is a persuasive tool, which has been used by
drug companies to convince the public of the existence of mental ill-
ness and its relevance to individuals. Further, misrepresentative in-
formation about pharmaceutical benefits is abundant in research ef-
forts, which inform DTC advertisements. As such, individuals are not
221 As discussed, infra notes 117-22, antidepressants are now the "top selling
drug category" and DTCA is thought to have had the most important effect on these
sales.
222 KOTLER, supra note 7 at 90-91.
223 Id. at 91 ("Many companies now conduct online focus groups to take
advantage of lower cost and faster, more detailed feedback. General Motors is using
the Web as a low-cost way to quickly gauge consumer reaction to vehicle features and
designs.").
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met with information about which they can make independent deter-
minations. Rather, they are often met with misrepresentative material
on the important issue of their mental well-being. Early review of
DTC ads may help to shed the misrepresentative material in the ads so
that the public may make independent decisions about the information
in DTC advertisements.
Also, admittedly, the sheer number of requests submitted for re-
view, coupled with the attendant delay caused by extensive review
may prove too high a cost for the FDA to accept such a proposition.
However, analogizing to marketing research solutions more generally
may be a feasible way for the FDA to address consumers' interests in
DTC advertising.
Finally, with regard to information which informs the direct-to-
consumer advertisements, the medical research community should be
held to strict disclosure standards regarding conflict of interest.
Though forced disclosure involves First Amendment concerns, norms
within the arena of corporate law and securities regulations require
disclosure of conflicts of interest, so that -shareholders' financial in-
terests are protected.224 Arguably, consumer interests in straight-
forward health information are more critical than consumer interests
in honest financial information. Accordingly, ethics codes governing
clinical reports and journal articles should require disclosure of drug
company sponsorship at the beginning and/or end of any reports so
sponsored. Just as the authors of medical research are accountable for
their work due to the prominent display of their names (and, occasion-
ally, their pictures) on the article itself, the monetary sponsors of the
research accounts should bear responsibility for their contribution.
VI. CONCLUSION
Though there are important economic and self-expression inter-
ests involved in drug companies' right to advertise, the consumer in-
terest against medicalizing common problems, and against relying on
biased information when making healthcare decisions, outweighs
these interests. More stringent supervision is needed.
Currently, there is a critical delay between the FDA's discovery of
deceptive advertising and any regulatory action on the part of the
FDA. Consumers are already exposed to false or misleading informa-
224 See, e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745,
788-89 (2002); and Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (holding
company chairman and CEO liable for failing to disclose information to directors and
then, accordingly, for failing to disclose to shareholders that they were not adequately
informed by directors on the decision of whether the company should execute a lever-
aged buy-out).
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tion because "the cycle of advertising has usually run its course before
the FDA directive arrives." 225 Moreover, though drug companies will
stop an offending ad from running after it has been regulated, there is
evidence that drug companies repeat false claims in subsequent ads
for identical drugs.226
Consumers' interests in truth in drug advertising must gain
sharper focus. The problem with DTCA of psychiatric drugs is one
that affects all consumers, as we have a keen concern in the appropri-
ate medical approach to our mental health. Early FDA review of di-
rect to consumer advertisements and educated screening of those ad-
vertisements, coupled with disclosure of conflicts of interest in drug
research may begin to address consumer interests in DTC drug adver-
tising. Solutions borrowed from business administration norms and
corporate law, although not without complications, may help ensure
that companies utilizing DTCA do not undermine consumers' oppor-
tunity to make rational decisions about assessment and treatment of
their mental health.
225 McLellan, supra note 6, at 1951.
226 Id.
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